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Abstract: Entrepreneurship is largely ignored, or treated in a highly simplified way, in endogenous 
growth theory. Still, it is now widely recognized that the supply of entrepreneurial talent is likely 
to be important for economic growth, innovation, and job creation. In this study we provide an in-
depth examination of how the supply of productive entrepreneurship is likely to be affected by the 
kind of tax and welfare arrangements that may prevail in a mature welfare state. Sweden, allegedly 
the most extensive of all welfare states, is the object of the empirical analysis. It is argued that the 
Swedish welfare state early on chose a specific “Swedish Model” of trying to combine ambitious 
welfare programs and a high tax burden with good opportunities for economic growth. This 
particular view rested heavily on the assumption that innovative activity was best performed in 
large established firms and that entry of new firms was less important. Consequently, policy and 
institutions were geared to promoting certain types of activities, which could deliver growth if 
scale economies are important and intrapreneurship can substitute for entrepreneurship. However, 
in an environment where entry, exit and turnover of firms are important for growth, and where 
scale-economies are less important, this kind of model may be more problematic. Both aggregate 
economic performance and data on firm growth and direct measures of entrepreneurial activity are 
broadly consistent with the identified structure of payoffs. A number of measures that can be 
implemented to strengthen entrepreneurial incentives within extensive welfare states are 
discussed, but the fact still remains that an entrepreneurial culture and a welfare state seem very 
remotely related. As a result, the respective cultures are unlikely to be promoted by a similar set of 
institutions. 
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Over the past decades endogenous growth theory has developed models that come closer to 
making explicit what drives long-term economic development. More specifically, explicit 
incentives for innovation have been included so as to explain why individuals would engage 
in creating new technologies and better ways of producing goods and services (see Barro and 
Sala-i-Martin 1995, Aghion and Howitt 1998). However, the actual agents of change, the 
entrepreneurs, are still defined rather narrowly and theory cannot be said to capture the wide-
ranging and complex functions suggested outside mainstream economics (see for example 
Glancey and McQuaid 2000, Swedberg 2000, and Bianchi and Henrekson 2005). 
 
Common for theories of endogenous growth are that they stress (expected) pay-offs from 
innovation or more generally the gains from activities which improve production and 
organization. Consequently, taxes and benefits which reduce incentives for engaging in such 
activities, or policies which decrease their return should be expected to reduce growth. It is 
commonly thought that the welfare state is characterized by large marginal tax wedges, 
reduced incentives to save and accumulate capital, and policies which discourage innovation 
in general. If this is the case, the welfare state should be expected to reduce innovation and 
consequently growth. However, it is possible that the disincentive effects from taxes are 
countered by spending the money on growth-enhancing activities such as schooling, 
infrastructure, or well functioning institutions. It is also possible – as has been pointed out by 
e.g. Steinmo 1993 and Lindert 2002 – that taxes in a welfare state can be raised in ways which 
are more pro-growth and less progressive than is typically imagined. In short, there is no 
simple theoretical relation between high taxes and a large public sector, and negative effects 
on economic performance of a country. This mixed view seems to be supported by the 
empirical literature as well.1  
 
This, however, does not imply that the welfare state has no effect on economic performance. 
On the contrary, the fact that a welfare state almost by definition reaches into more areas of 
                                                 
1 Studies which find negative coefficients on “government consumption” in cross-country growth regressions are 
for example Easterly and Rebelo (1993), Barro (1997). Fölster and Henrekson (2001) also find negative growth 
effect from a large public sector. However, Slemrod (1995), Mendoza, Milesi-Ferretti and Asea (1997), and 
Agell, Lindh and Ohlsson (1997) find no clear costs from social spending. In an overview Temple (1999) 
concludes that there seems to be no convincing evidence that growth is harmed by having a large public sector.   2
the lives of its citizens also means that it, to a larger extent than a smaller state, shapes “the 
rules of the game in society” (North 1990, p. 3). The ultimate questions about the impact of 
the welfare state on economic growth therefore concern the particular incentive structure 
which results in the welfare state, and to what extent this forms the set of “appropriate 
institutions” for a given economy.2  
 
This chapter addresses a specific subset of questions concerning the interrelations between 
endogenous growth theory, the welfare state and entrepreneurship. The purpose is to examine, 
in an exploratory fashion, how the supply of entrepreneurship – and to a lesser extent its 
distribution across activities – is likely to be affected by the kind of tax and welfare 
arrangements that prevail in a typical mature welfare state. In particular, we will stress that it 
is not simply a question of high taxation or large public programs, as their undisputed 
negative effects can in principal be countered by positive ones, but rather we will focus on the 
particular incentives created within the system.  
 
Given that Sweden probably has the most extensive welfare state of all countries (Lindbeck 
1997) the country offers a “laboratory”, or testing ground, for such an examination. We will 
argue that the Swedish welfare state, through attempting to combine high taxation and the 
creation of large public programs with sustained incentives for growth, created a particular 
incentive structure in which long-term economic progress depends heavily on the success of 
established large companies. A key assumption for this view – largely inspired by Schumpeter 
1942 and later advanced by e.g. Galbraith 1956 – was the idea that innovative activity was 
best performed within these large firms while the role of individual entrepreneurs and entry of 
new firms was considered less important.  
 
Our analysis is greatly inspired by Baumol’s (1990) study, but since “the structure of payoffs” 
for entrepreneurship is examined for a modern welfare state both the institutional analysis and 
the relative performance measures are more precise than in Baumol’s broad historical 
                                                 
2 The term “appropriate institutions” was coined by Gerschenkron (1962) and has recently received renewed 
attention in e.g. Acemoglu, Aghion and Zillibotti (2003), and others. They focus on differences in what 
constitutes good policy depending on a country’s “distance to the technological frontier”. We will use it in a 
broader sense where institutions may be “appropriate” with respect to a number of other aspects of the economy 
such as distribution of firms in different industries, the size of these firms, etc. But more importantly we will 
stress that policies which were initially “appropriate” may persist due to vested interests even after exogenous 
changes (or catch-up to the frontier) have made these policies “inappropriate”.      3
comparisons. Similar studies are needed for other national settings in order to find out the 
degree to which the findings in this paper have general validity. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 entrepreneurship is defined more precisely and 
some useful distinctions are made. We also discuss why entrepreneurship is likely to be 
particularly important for economic development in a modern economy. In Section 3 the 
modern welfare state is characterized, and more specifically its implementation in Sweden is 
outlined with regard to aspects that are relevant from an entrepreneurial perspective. Section 4 
outlines a political economy theory of the Swedish Model as a compromise between the large 
established firms and the representatives of workers which lead to the combination of a high 
average tax rate, a large public sector, but with relatively low tax on capital and relatively 
favorable conditions for certain types of industries and business entities. This section gives a 
number of broad predictions which will be followed up in the remaining sections. In Section 5 
we look in more detail at what kind of policies this lead to, while we in Section 6 study to 
what extent the empirical evidence regarding entrepreneurial activity in Sweden is consistent 
with what may be predicted from the incentive structure. Section 7 concludes.  
 
2.  Defining entrepreneurship and its links to economic growth 
 
The entrepreneur and entrepreneurship are elusive entities. In the literature one can find at 
least 13 distinct themes developed around these concepts (Hébert and Link 1989). The most 
influential view is probably the one proposed by Schumpeter (1934, 1942), who saw the 
entrepreneur as somebody who caused disequilibrium by introducing new technologies 
(“creative destruction”). Kirzner (1973), on the other hand, emphasizes the role of pushing the 
economy back towards equilibrium by exploiting previously unperceived opportunities to 
reach the production possibility frontier. A third influential view was originally proposed by 
Knight (1921), who sees entrepreneurs as agents who receive a rate of return for bearing what 
he dubbed “genuine uncertainty”, i.e. non-calculable risk.  
 
In the context of this paper these subtleties are of less importance, and to capture the most 
important mechanisms we will define entrepreneurship, in line with Wennekers and Thurik 
(1999), as the ability and willingness of individuals, both on their own and within 
organizations to: (i) perceive and create new economic opportunities; (ii) introduce their ideas 
in the market, in the face of uncertainty and other obstacles, by making decisions on location,   4
form and the use of resources and institutions; and (iii) compete with others for a share of that 
market.  
 
Thus, in order for an activity to be defined as entrepreneurial it needs to be novel at least in 
some sense, but whether it is novel because it applies new knowledge or uses existing 
knowledge in new ways does not matter. There must also be an ambition to grow. As a result, 
one cannot define entrepreneurship as self-employment or firm formation per se. A person 
may be entrepreneurial both in his/her role as business owner/self-employed or as an 
employee (intrapreneur).  
 
Baumol (1990) and Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1991) specifically deal with the effect of 
institutions/the social payoff structure on the distribution of entrepreneurship between 
productive and unproductive/destructive activities. Baumol assumes that the supply of 
entrepreneurship, i.e. the application of entrepreneurial talent, is roughly a constant, while its 
distribution between productive and unproductive activities is affected by the social payoff 
structure. This assumption is unnecessarily restrictive; there are a priori reasons to assume 
that the incentive structure will affect both the total supply of entrepreneurial talent and its 
distribution across activities that are more or less socially productive. 
 
Baumol’s broad historical analysis makes clear that the factors that “forge the structure of 
payoffs” for entrepreneurship are many-faceted, but it is also obvious that the incentive 
structure cannot be characterized in much detail using this historical method. This is of course 
easier if one chooses to study contemporary institutional contexts. 
 
By the 1930s the idea that economic development from then on would be possible without the 
entrepreneurial function had gained strength. In particular, Schumpeter argued forcibly in 
favour of this view in his 1942 classic Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, where he 
claimed that by means of modern techniques and modern modes of organization, the 
innovation process would become increasingly automated. Innovations would no longer be 
associated with the efforts and brilliance of specific individuals.  
 
The notion that large-scale production and a social order with strong collectivist elements 
would promote economic development had many advocates at the time. In particular, 
Galbraith (1956, 1967) provided an important rationale for economic policy oriented towards   5
large corporations. He argued that in a modern industrial society, innovative activity as well 
as improvements in current products and production processes could be carried out most 
efficiently within the realm of the large industrial corporation. Individual efforts, and hence 
individual incentives, would dwindle in importance, and small firms and entrepreneurs came 
to be seen as marginal elements in the process of economic development. We will come back 
to these ideas as they have been of particular importance in the Swedish case. 
 
The long period during which large firms had predominated and small firms had been 
increasingly marginalized came to an end in the 1970s. Entrepreneurship and small firms 
experienced a global resurgence (Brock and Evans 1986; Loveman and Sengenberger 1991). 
Several reasons why this occurred have been suggested: 
 
(i)  Technological change in recent decades has resulted in large reductions in transaction 
costs in the market, fostering increased specialization across firms and sharper focus on 
each firm’s core activity. Outsourcing and corporate downsizing are concrete 
manifestations of this change (Carlsson 1999; Piore and Sabel 1984).  
(ii)  Since the 1960s, there has been a sizeable shift away from industries characterized by 
large firms (manufacturing, extraction, construction) towards service industries where 
firms and establishments tend to be smaller (see, e.g. Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh 
1996). 
(iii)  In tandem with increased incomes, consumers have come to demand more differentiated 
products rather than standardized products suitable for large-scale production and 
distribution (Piore and Sabel 1984; Carree and Thurik 1999). 
(iv)  In many cases, large, mature firms cannot introduce genuinely new products and 
production methods efficiently. In the long run, radically new technology is required to 
sustain a high growth rate, since firms in other countries at lower income levels will 
sooner or later imitate current technologies. Large firms often excel in increasing 
productivity in the manufacture of existing products, while totally new products are 
often produced more efficiently in newly established firms, which have been started 
with the purpose of producing these very products (Baldwin and Johnson 1999; 
Audretsch 1995). 
(v)  Small entrepreneurial firms can often act as crucial agents of change. When such firms 
are motivated to grow they are likely to play a particularly important role in the growth 
process (Audretsch 1995). 
(vi)  The small-business sector can function as an inexpensive mechanism for identifying and 
developing entrepreneurial and managerial talent (Lucas 1978). 
 
The first three mechanisms contribute to an increased tendency for more goods and services 
to be produced more efficiently in smaller firms and establishments – for structural as well as 
technological reasons. The last three mechanisms are more dynamic.    6
 
Lately, the importance of entry, exit and turnover of firms – especially in countries close to 
the technological frontier – has also been stressed, in for example, Aghion and Howitt (2005). 
In general, the importance of turnover could be seen as the standard Schumpeterian idea that 
faster growth implies a higher rate of firm turnover as new innovators enter, replacing the 
former, who exit. However, as noted by Aghion et al. (2005) there are several effects going in 
opposite directions in terms of how increased competition affects incentives to innovate. On 
the one hand, stricter competition may reduce growth by reducing post-innovation returns to 
successful innovators. On the other hand stricter competition induces more “escape 
competition”, that is incentives for innovation so as to break away from ones competitors 
through superior technology. They also stress that exit may be positive for productivity 
growth because it replaces less efficient firms (or inputs) by better ones. The relative size of 
these effects depends in their framework on the distance to the technological frontier and, 
more specifically, the closer a country (or a sector) is to the frontier, the more important is 
entry.  
 
Caree et al. (2002) hypothesize that there ought to be a U-shaped relationship between the 
degree of entrepreneurial activity and the level of development. Empirically, this is tested by 
using the rate of self-employment as a proxy for entrepreneurial activity. Some support for the 
hypothesis is found, in particular for the existence of a downward-sloping segment up to a 
certain level of income. Wennekers et al. (2005) instead measure entrepreneurial activity as 
the rate of “nascent entrepreneurship” from the 2002 GEM study (Reynolds et al 2005; see 
section 6) for 36 countries. In this case the hypothesized U-shape is more evident in the data. 
Furthermore, Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003) show that high entry costs and a lower degree of 
turnover in Europe compared to the US are important for explaining Europe’s relatively 
disappointing growth performance over the past decades, and Sapir et al. (2003) argue that an 
important reason for the fact that Europe stopped catching up with the US GDP per capita in 
the mid 1970s has been the failure to switch institutions to ones which promote entry of new 
firms.  
 
3.  The Mature Welfare State 
 
In line with Lindbeck (1988) the term ”welfare state” is reserved for the array of publicly 
financed provision or subsidization of personal services, notably for health, education, child   7
care and care of the elderly, and for social security systems, transfers and subsidies. The 
welfare state may of course be defined more broadly by including a number of non-budget or 
regulatory measures such as price and rent controls and regulations of labor and capital 
markets, where these measures are intended to benefit particular groups or activities that are 
considered to be in need of extra support or protection.  
 
The expansion of the welfare state was a salient feature of almost all industrialized countries, 
in particular during the 1960s and 1970s (Castles 1998; Beck 1981). This tendency was most 
pronounced in Sweden. In 1960 Sweden was not an exceptional case; the relative size of the 
public sector was only marginally above the OECD average.3 But over the following quarter 
of a century this situation changed dramatically, and since the late 1960s Sweden has had the 
largest public sector measured as a share of GDP in the OECD, in particular government 
consumption as a share of GDP became very high by the 1980s (close to 30 per cent of GDP), 
which resulted in a very large share of public employment; public sector employment has 
constituted approximately one third of total employment since about 1980. Total government 
expenditures as a share of GDP were almost 25 percentage points above the OECD average 
by the early 1980s. During the latter half of the 1980s the difference diminished somewhat on 
the expenditure side, but measured from the income side, the public sector remained at a level 
that was more than 20 percentage points larger as a share of GDP than the OECD average. In 
the early 1990s the expenditure ratio exploded, largely reflecting the abysmal downturn of the 
economy. During the latter half of the 1990s the government spending share decreased 
substantially as a combined effect of austerity measures and the strong recovery after the 
crisis of the early 1990s. Still, in the first years of the 21
st century, the public sector was 
almost 50 per cent larger than the OECD average. 
 
The Swedish welfare state is so large because ambitions are high both regarding social 
insurance and public service production. The welfare state cares for its citizens from “cradle 
to grave” through a large number of schemes (parental leave, child care, medical and dental 
care, sickness cash benefits, disability pensions, unemployment benefits and public pensions). 
Income-related, as opposed to flat rate, programs are the rule, which makes the programs 
costly, and furthermore a number of measures have been introduced over the years that have 
raised the lower threshold for disposable income. See Forslund (1997) and Aronsson and 
                                                 
3 Going back to 1950 the ratio of total public expenditure to GDP was among the lowest of all industrial 
countries at roughly 26 per cent, the same level as Switzerland and the United States.   8
Walker (1997) for an overview of the programs. The consensus view is that the Swedish 
welfare state has been successful in a number of ways, notably in eliminating poverty and 
equalizing income, wealth, hours of work and consumption in virtually every respect (over the 
life cycle, across individuals, across households) (Freeman et al. 1997; Forslund 1997; 
Lindbeck 1997). 
 
Increasingly, economists recognized the disincentive effects created by a welfare state as 
extensive as the Swedish one, and these effects were found to be multidimensional, affecting 
both the choice of work, quantity of market work, intensity of work, investment in human and 
physical capital, and a host of other dimensions. By the 1990s there were also studies that 
showed that the overall effect of the welfare systems made it unprofitable to work at all for 
substantial groups in society – see, e.g. Ds 1994:81 and Ds 1997:73.4 It is impossible to give a 
short summary of the numerous studies, but it is fair to say that overall, economists have 
emphasized the accumulated disincentive effects of regulations in the capital, product and 
labor markets and how these have interacted with the disincentive effects emanating from 
high marginal effects caused by the tax and transfer systems (Agell 1996; Lindbeck 1997). 
However, surprisingly little attention has been given to the incentive effects of welfare state 
arrangements on the supply of entrepreneurial effort and its distribution across activities. 
 
3. The political economics of entrepreneurial policy in the Swedish welfare state  
 
Above we have discussed aspects of entrepreneurship, endogenous growth theory and some 
features of the Swedish welfare state. A reoccurring theme has been to point to the importance 
of the incentives created by policy and in particular that appropriate policies may be highly 
context specific. However, so far we have said nothing about how policy is chosen. In this 
section we will first briefly discuss some standard theories of growth where policy is 
endogenous. We will then discuss some early key ideas about growth policy in the Swedish 
context and see how the presented political economy ideas could be modified to understand 
these policies as well as how they can persist, even if they no longer constitute what would be 
appropriate for enhancing growth.  
 
                                                 
4 According to one influential welfare state scholar, Gøsta Esping-Andersen (1990), this is in line with the 
ultimate aim of the Nordic welfare state model, namely, to achieve “the decommodification of labor”.    9
Early endogenous growth theory focused on capital accumulation as the engine of economic 
growth (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1995). With this view, economic growth is ultimately a 
function of individual decisions about capital accumulation, and policy which affects these 
decisions has an effect on growth. A number of political economy models – i.e. models where 
policy is determined endogenously through a political process – have been developed to study 
how, for example, income inequality maps into the choice of broad policies like taxation and 
redistribution. In models developed by e.g. Alesina and Rodrik (1994) and Persson and 
Tabellini (1994) high inequality will raise the demand for redistribution, which in turn will 
lead to high taxes, lowering the returns on investment, thus lowering growth. If, on the other 
hand, the increased revenue is used to promote infrastructure, to support education or to 
finance some other policy which may be conducive to accumulation and investment, this 
could outweigh the negative effect of the tax wedge.5 Combining these ideas we get the much 
debated trade-off between the negative effects from high taxes on investment and savings on 
the one hand, and the possibility of using tax revenue to promote growth.  
 
A central idea – not present in the above theories of endogenous policy choice – around the 
time of the expansion of the Swedish welfare state was that high taxes were possible without 
hurting capital accumulation. As long as taxes did not harm the incentives of those who were 
thought to be important for the growth-enhancing investments (which would create 
employment) disincentive effects on others were less of a concern. In particular, detrimental 
effects on the entrepreneurial function were not thought to be important, since – as already 
noted in section 2 –  the dominant view at the time was that the entrepreneur was waning in 
importance. The notion that large-scale production and a social order with strong collectivist 
elements were conducive to economic development had considerable appeal.6  
 
Key elements of the Swedish Model are in line with this vision: The large corporations and 
the public sector as engines of economic development, the perceived unimportance of 
individual incentives for entrepreneurship, effort and human capital investment, and the claim 
that not just large-scale production but also innovative activity and renewal could be 
subordinated to Fordist organizational principles. By the late 1960s it was clear that the ruling 
                                                 
5 Some examples of political economy formalizations of such ideas are Saint-Paul and Verdier (1993), Perotti 
(1996) and Benabou (1996). 
6 We will not go into details of how this vision changed over time. In particular, we will not deal with the 
(failed) attempt to introduce wage-earner funds. See for example Pontusson (1992) and Henrekson and 
Jacobsson (2001) for more on this.      10
party, the Social Democrats, considered small firms and individual entrepreneurs as marginal 
elements in the process of economic development, and in due course such phenomena were 
expected to be totally anachronistic (Henrekson and Jakobsson 2001). Johansson and 
Magnusson (1998) describe how a vision of  “capitalism without capitalists” developed. They 
claim that this vision is crucial, because it constitutes  
 
…the link uniting collectivism and market dynamics. As a result, capitalism can be salvaged – 
without requiring powerful owners or capitalists. Redistribution of income can co-exist with high 
profits in the most dynamic firms (p. 121). 
 
 
Could such a policy be an endogenous outcome of a political process? Could there be an 
outcome where policy is characterized by high redistributive ambitions, a high general tax 
rate, but relatively favorable conditions for large incumbent firms? The short answer is “yes”. 
As shown in Roine (2004) it is possible, even in a purely redistributional setting, to have 
political equilibria characterized by a coalition where those with the very highest initial 
resources can agree with those with the smallest initial resources to tax the middle group 
heavily as long as they (the top group) do not pay (full) taxes themselves.7 Applying a similar 
logic to the build up of the Swedish welfare state, the (owners of the) initially large firms 
could agree with (the representatives of) the workers (i.e. the unions) to have generally high 
taxes, as long as there were some concessions for them. In fact, such an agreement can even 
be seen as more beneficial to the large firms than a generally lower tax rate, since high taxes 
act as a barrier to entry for initially small firms with growth ambitions, but which are too 
small to be part of the initial coalition. As we shall see in the next section, there are several 
indications both regarding the structure of taxation and the size distribution of firms over 
time, which support this view.       
 
A set of institutions which benefits incumbent firms in certain sectors is obviously favorable 
to them. But is it also possible that this outcome contributes to growth? Again the short 
answer is “yes”. As has already been pointed out above, policies favoring large incumbent 
                                                 
7 In Roine (2004) the setting is one where taxes can be avoided by paying a (large) fixed cost. This results in a 
situation where only those with high income optimally choose to invest in tax avoidance. If their taxable income 
(i.e. income after avoidance) is low enough they face a trade-off between taxation and redistribution similar to 
those with lower incomes, leading to the unusual coalition. A similar logic could be used on the politics of the 
Swedish welfare state. If there is, for example, a high entry cost for gaining political influence, such influence 
would only be possible for initially large firms. They could then support high general taxes, as long as they get 
special treatment (avoidance possibilities). This would lead to a situation with generally high taxes, which hurt 
investment (and growth) in small firms but has no adverse effects on the large incumbent firms. Indeed, one can 
even see an additional motive for them to favor the generally high taxes, namely that they act as a barrier of 
entry on small firms with growth ambitions.     11
firms can be appropriate if there are important economies of scale making larger firms more 
efficient in production as well as better suited for innovative activities. Indeed, if this is the 
case, individual efforts can be seen as a waste of resources as well as entrepreneurial talent 
and the role of new entrants is small.  
 
What kind of institutions should we expect to evolve as a result of the unusual coalition 
between the (representatives) of the workers and the initially important firms (the large capital 
holders)? The theory, of course, says nothing about the exact policies (only that general taxes 
and redistributive ambitions be high, while there are exemptions for large firms and capital 
owners) but in terms of incentive structure we could expect institutions favoring: 
 
•  Large established firms over smaller, new entrants; 
•  Industry which is intensive in physical rather than human capital; 
•  Intrapreneurship over entrepreneurship. 
 
And in terms of outcomes we should expect: 
 
•  An industry structure dominated by large and relatively old firms; 
•  A tax system where investment in physical capital is treated favorably (especially 
relative to human capital); 
•  Most innovation taking place within existing corporations;  
•  A declining share of total taxable income being business income; 
•  A political rapport between established firms and large capital owners and 
representatives of the workers and unions.8 
 
It is important to emphasize once again, that it is not theoretically possible to conclude that 
this set of policies is good or bad for growth. In line with Gerschenkron’s idea of “appropriate 
institutions”, policies favoring large corporations could be growth conducive compared to an 
“incentive-neutral” policy (holding total taxation and redistribution constant). However, if it 
turns out to be the case that the initially favored firms are not the ones best suited for 
continued growth and innovation, or that exogenous changes make human-capital intensive 
                                                 
8 See, e.g. Pontusson (1992) and Steinmo (1993) and their extensive references on this topic. As pointed out 
above we do not go into details of, for example, the differences within the Social Democratic Party regarding 
this policy.      12
firms become increasingly important, this kind of policy may be inimical to growth. In 
particular, if it is the case that entry, turnover and exit of firms and individual 




5. Welfare state policies and incentives for entrepreneurship 
 
In this section we will explore in more detail how a number of institutions of the Swedish 
welfare state affect incentives for entrepreneurship. 
 
5.1  Taxation of entrepreneurial income 
 
Income emanating from successful entrepreneurial activity is often capitalized in the form of 
ownership of equity that appreciates in value. However, over time the Swedish tax code 
evolved in a way that was highly congruent with a vision of a market economy without 
individual capitalists and entrepreneurs. This is clear from Table 1 where effective marginal 
tax rates for different combinations of owners and sources of finance are presented for 
selected years from 1980 until 2001. Three categories of owners and sources of finance are 
identified, and the effective marginal tax rate is calculated assuming a pre-tax real rate of 
return of 10 per cent. A negative number means that the real rate of return is greater after tax 
than before tax.9 
 
The table highlights three important aspects of the Swedish tax system (for further details and 
additional years, see Davis and Henrekson 1997). First, by 1980 debt financing consistently 
received an extremely favorable tax treatment relative to new share issues. Second, the 
taxation of households as owners is much higher than for other categories, and their rate of 
taxation started to increase sharply in the 1960s, whereas the reverse occurred for insurance 
companies and tax-exempt institutions.10 From some point in the 1960s until the 1991 tax 
reform, more than 100 per cent of the real rate of return was taxed away for a household 
                                                 
9 The effective real tax rates presented in Table 1 result from a complex interaction of a vast array of different 
tax rates, accounting and valuation rates, asymmetric effects of inflation etc. This is described in depth in 
Södersten (1984, 1993). 
10 Tax-exempt institutions by definition pay no tax on interest receipts, dividends or capital gains. This category 
includes charities, scientific and cultural foundations, foundations for employee recreation set up by companies, 
pension funds for supplementary occupational pension schemes, and the National Pension Fund (now seven 
funds). In terms of industry ownership and control, tax-exempt institutions have a dominant position in Sweden.   13
buying a newly issued share. Third, tax-exempt institutions benefit from a large tax advantage 
relative to the other two categories of owners, and this advantage increased strongly during 
the 1960s and 1970s. 
 
Table 1  Effective Marginal Tax Rates for Different Combinations of Owners and 
  Sources of Finance, 1980, 1991 and 2001 (10% real pre-tax rate of return at 
  actual inflation rates). 




1980   
Households 58.2 136.6 51.9 
Tax exempt institutions  –83.4 –11.6 11.2 
Insurance companies  –54.9 38.4 28.7 
      
1991   
Households 31.3 62.0 54.6 
Tax exempt institutions  –10.0 7.3 20.4 
Insurance companies  14.0 33.5 32.0 
      
2001   
Households 29.7/24.7† 61.0/51.0† 44.1/34.1† 
Tax exempt institutions  –1.4 23.6 23.6 
Insurance companies  19.6 47.2 44.7 
†Excluding wealth tax; the wealth tax on unlisted shares was abolished in 1992. 
Notes: All calculations are based on the actual asset composition in manufacturing. The following inflation rates 
were used: 1980: 9.4%, 1991: 5%, 1994: 3%, 2001: 3%. These calculations conform to the general framework 
developed in King and Fullerton (1984). The average holding period is assumed to be 10 years. 
Source: Calculations provided by Jan Södersten; see Södersten (1984, 1993). 
 
Households owning a successful business typically faced an even higher tax rate because of 
the combined effect of wealth and income taxation. Until 1992, wealth tax was levied on 30 
per cent of the net worth of a family-owned company. As of the mid-1980s, the maximum 
wealth tax rate was 3 per cent. Since the wealth tax was not deductible at the company level, 
funds required to pay the wealth tax were first subject to the personal income tax and the 
mandatory payroll tax. From around the mid 1960s until the late 1980s the taxation of 
individually owned firms that could not work with extreme debt-equity ratios was so high that 
it could be seen as confiscatory in real terms (see Södersten 1984). This spurred the formation 
of a number of so-called bank-connected investment companies that acquired a large share of 
the medium-sized family-owned businesses (Petersson 2001).  
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This makes clear the extraordinary extent to which the Swedish tax system favored, and still 
favors, institutional ownership and discouraged direct household ownership of firms, which is 
a prerequisite for entrepreneurial firms, at least in the early phase of their life cycle.  
 
In order to analyze how the tax system impacts on entrepreneurial behavior it is not sufficient 
to focus on the taxation of owners of firms. To a large extent the return on entrepreneurial 
effort is taxed as wage income. First, a large part of income accruing from closely held 
companies has to be paid out as wage income, since there are severe restrictions on the room 
for dividends even if the firm is profitable, and the capital gains tax is normally 43 per cent 
for small closely held firms instead of the regular 30 per cent, since half of the capital gain is 
taxed as wage income. Second, a great deal of the entrepreneurial function is carried out by 
employees without an ownership stake in the firm, and the total marginal tax wedge for high-
income earners has been high in Sweden throughout the postwar period. Defining the total 
marginal tax wedge as all taxes paid as a percentage of total labor compensation paid by the 
employer, the marginal tax wedge for an average wage of an executive (just below the CEO 
level) went from 50 per cent in 1952 to a peak of 91 per cent in 1979, while the marginal tax 
wedge for the average white-collar worker peaked at 85 per cent. The comprehensive tax 
reform in 1991 simplified and lowered the income tax schedule, but as a result of increased 
local and consumption taxes the total tax wedge was still 75 per cent in the late 1990s for 
executives and the average white-collar worker alike (Du Rietz 1994; Nordling and 
Damsgaard 1998). In the early 2000s local taxes have continued to increase while some 
consumption taxes and property taxes have been lowered. In 2005 the overall tax wedge is 
still on the order of 75 per cent for these groups.  
 
Furthermore, the use of stock options to encourage and reward intrapreneurship is highly 
penalized by the tax system, since gains on options are taxed as wage income when the stock 
options are tied to employment in the firm. Thus, they are subjected both to mandatory social 
security (33 per cent) and the marginal tax rate. Since the marginal tax rate is roughly 57 per 
cent this entails a total tax rate of roughly 68 per cent (2005).11 In practice, stock options can 
                                                 
11 This stands in stark contrast to the US where an employee who accepts stock options can defer the tax liability 
to the time when the stocks were sold rather than when the options were exercised. In general, there are (i) no tax 
consequences to the employee upon the grant or the exercise of the option; (ii) the employee is taxed at capital 
gains rates when the stock acquired upon the exercise of the option is sold after a specified holding period; and 
(iii) there is no deduction available to the employer. This change in the law shifted the tax risk in the options   15
therefore not be used as a means to reward entrepreneurial behavior among wealth-
constrained individuals.12 
 
Finally, it is now widely recognized that venture capital firms can play a crucial role in the 
development of a small entrepreneurial venture by converting high-risk opportunities to a 
more acceptable risk level through portfolio diversification, and adding key competencies that 
the firm may be lacking. This is achieved by means of developing arrangements that align the 
incentives of the three agents – investors, venture capitalists and entrepreneurial startups 
(Zider 1998; Gompers and Lerner 2001). However, the above-described tax schedules apply 
to this industry as well, which means that a highly competent venture capital industry where 




5.2  Incentives for savings and individual wealth formation 
 
Welfare state provisions remove a number of savings motives for the individual. As long as 
unemployment insurance, income-dependent pensions and sick-leave benefits, higher 
education and highly subsidized health and care services are provided by the government, 
most of the essential savings motives for the average person disappear. Means-tested schemes 
such as social assistance may exacerbate this effect at the lower end since it is conditional on 
the individual not having any assets (Hubbard, Skinner and Zeldes 1995). Moreover, pay-as-
you-go pension systems tend to lower national savings and investment compared to funded 
systems (Feldstein 1996). Thus, in an extensive welfare state system, total savings motives are 
much reduced. Individual savings rates and average holdings of readily available assets are 
also very low in Sweden by international comparison – see Table 2 and Pålsson (1998).  
 
                                                                                                                                                         
back to the government, and thus accomplished two things: it increased the potential profit from the stock 
options and it allowed budget-constrained individuals to sell stocks whenever they chose to do so (Misher 1984). 
12 Stock options are also mostly offered to the top level management in large listed firms. In this case, there is 
more room for arrangements where stock-option gains are taxed largely as capital income, i.e. at 30 per cent 
rather than 68 per cent.  
13 See Henrekson and Rosenberg (2001) for a fuller exposition of this issue.   16
Table 2  Household Net Saving as a Share of Disposable Income in Sweden, OECD and 
OECD Europe, 1960–2004 (per cent). 
 
 1960–69  1970–79 1980–89 1990–97  1998–2004
Sweden  6.1 4.0 1.1 5.4 2.5
OECD 9.7  12.1 11.2 9.8†  6.2
OECD  Europe  12.0 13.6 11.6 10.9‡ 10.9
 
†1990–95. ‡1990–96. 
Note: Savings in equity pension funds are excluded. OECD Europe 1998–2004 is defined as the Euro-12 
countries. 
Sources: OECD, Historical Statistics 1960–1980 and 1960–1995; OECD, Economic Outlook, Vol. 65, 1999 and 
Vol. 77, 2005. 
 
There are numerous research results suggesting that such disincentives to savings and 
individual wealth accumulation are likely to lower the propensity to supply entrepreneurial 
effort. The availability of equity financing is a critical factor for both startups and the 
expansion of existing firms. In general, the riskier the business, the greater the need to rely on 
equity relative to debt financing and the smaller and newer the firm, the more difficult for 
outside financiers to assess the viability and profitability of the proposed investment project. 
Thus, ceteris paribus, small and newly established firms are more dependent on equity 
financing than large, well-established firms. Low private savings also exacerbate the inherent 
problem caused by asymmetric information, since wealth-constrained would-be entrepreneurs 
are unable to signal forcibly to outside investors by means of making sizeable equity infusions 
of their own. 
 
There is substantial scientific evidence supporting the idea that the individual wealth position 
has important effects for the probability of becoming an entrepreneur and for the propensity to 
expand. For example, Lindh and Ohlsson (1996, 1998) find that the likelihood of starting a 
business in Sweden increases significantly among those who receive an inheritance or a 
lottery gain. They also find that a more unequal wealth distribution covaries positively with 
the share of self-employed. Similar evidence is found for the US by Holtz-Eakin et al. (1994). 
This is probably the most well-established finding in the small business economics literature, 
and there are a host of further studies pointing to the importance of personal assets for the 
degree to which entrepreneurial talent is exploited, see e.g. Blanchflower and Oswald (1998) 
and Taylor (2001), and the overview of this literature in Parker (2004, Ch. 5–6). 
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In addition to the welfare state reducing the need for savings for precautionary as well as life-
cycle reasons, taxation has created additional disincentives. The real rate of taxation on 
financial savings was extremely high in Sweden for individuals before the 1990/91 tax 
reform. On interest income it typically exceeded 100 per cent by a wide margin during the 
1970s and 80s. The rate of taxation on saving and wealth accumulation remains high. First, 
the high tax rates on wage income make it hard to save a substantial portion of income that 
can subsequently be used for equity financing. Second, total taxation on accumulated wealth 
is high (2005): 30 per cent on the nominal current return, 30 per cent nominal capital gains tax 
and 1.5 per cent wealth tax on real estate, interest-bearing instruments and prime listed stock. 
 
The combination of low private savings and an extremely even distribution (Lindh and 
Ohlsson 1998) of these low savings implies that few people are able to raise the requisite 
equity, either themselves or from their associates, friends or relatives, to realize their business 
projects. 
 
In recent decades private saving has been encouraged through favorable tax treatment. This 
concerns both fully tax-deductible pension plans paid individually and supplementary 
occupational schemes. Through these schemes a person may accumulate substantial wealth. 
However, following the welfare state logic this is primarily seen as a complement to the 
income security provided by the government, and hence these funds are by law channeled to 
traditional financial institutions and the wealth is locked in, at least until age 55, and it cannot 
be lifted in large chunks. This is likely to reduce the supply of equity financing for potential 
entrepreneurs and extant small businesses, since pension funds are less suitable for channeling 
funds to entrepreneurs compared to business angels or venture capital firms. Hence, if the 
system is designed so that ordinary people are in effect obligated to carry out most of their 
savings through large collective systems, small business financing will suffer relative to 
alternative policies and institutional arrangements that allow for greater choice by individuals 
regarding their savings and investments.  
 
 
5.3  Government production of income-elastic services 
 
No doubt, Schumpeter and Galbraith almost exclusively dealt with the industrial, mostly 
goods-producing, sector of the economy. However, in Sweden the large-scale production in 
the manufacturing sector came to be seen as a role model also for central parts of the   18
production of highly income-elastic services such as health care, child care, elderly care and 
education (Rojas 2001). In these cases it was seen as natural that the public sector substituted 
for the large corporations, and as a result Fordist principles of planning, standardization and 
large-scale production came to characterize society as a whole – Rojas (2001) speaks of 
“social Fordism”. This strategy had a profound effect on employment growth across sectors; 
from 1960 until the mid 1990s all net employment growth in Sweden took place in the local 
government sector (Rosen 1997). 
 
These publicly produced private services are in many cases highly suitable for production in 
private and often also small firms. The political decision to produce these services primarily 
through a public sector monopoly has largely barred this area from both startup activity and 
the emergence of high-growth firms. Table 3 summarizes the share of private production for 
the major services that are fully or primarily tax-financed. The private production share is 
very low in activities like child care, care of the elderly and after-school care, despite the fact 
that these activities are highly amenable to private, small-firm production. The potential 
market is huge. The operating costs incurred by local governments for schooling, child care 
and care of the elderly exceeded 10 per cent of GDP per year in the mid 1990s, and the health 
care sector is almost as large.  
 
Table 3  Private Sector Production Share for Major Services that are Primarily   Publicly 
Funded, 1996 and 2000 (per cent). 
 
Service 1996 2000 
Institutional child care (pre-school)  12.5 11.8 
Child care in the home (of the 
professional) 
2.2 8.6 
After-school care  4.5  
Compulsory schooling  2.4 3.9 
High school  1.9 4.4 
Care of the elderly at nursing homes  8.3 10.0 
Care of the elderly in special apartments  5.1  
Care of the elderly in their own home  2.6  
Hospital care  4.3  
Medical consultations  28  
Share of doctors privately employed  10  
Psychiatric wards  24  
Children’s dental care  5  
Source: Werenfels Röttorp (1998) for 1996 and Jordahl (2002) for 2000. 
   19
Hence, due to the de facto monopolization by the public sector of the production of many 
income-elastic services vast areas of the economy have remained unexploited as sources of 
commercial growth. In particular in the health sector, it is easy to imagine how a different 




5.4  Household-related services out of reach for entrepreneurial exploitation 
 
A large percentage of all work, most notably household work, is performed outside the 
market. Cross-country comparisons of industry-level employment also point to considerable 
scope for substitution of certain economic activities between the market and nonmarket 
sectors (Davis and Henrekson 2005). For Sweden, studies indicate that more time is spent on 
production in the household than in the market. According to the 1997 Service Sector 
Taxation Report (SOU 1997:17), 7 billion hours were devoted to household work in 1993, 
while production of goods and public and private services accounted for 5.9 billion hours. 
Furthermore, paid work not reported to the tax authorities was estimated to represent 
approximately 10 per cent of the hours worked in the marketplace. The same report also 
presents evidence that the private service sector is exceptionally small in Sweden compared to 
other OECD countries. This is particularly the case for wholesale and retail trade, hotels and 
restaurants and miscellaneous services. In a detailed industry level comparison of Sweden and 
the US, Davis and Henrekson (2005) demonstrate that relative employment in the US is 
considerably greater in household-related services, such as repair of durable goods, hotel and 
restaurant, retail sales, laundry and household work.15 
 
In a well-functioning, decentralized market economy, entrepreneurs can be expected to detect 
and act upon the potential for starting new operations or expand existing ones, thereby 
creating job opportunities. US trends in recent decades indicate that new jobs net primarily 
                                                 
14 Cf. the development in the US health sector during the 1990s, where strong competition between health care 
organizations have led to large cost reductions and efficiency gains, not least because modern information 
technology is systematically applied (Cutler et al. 2000; Litan and Rivlin 2002).  
15 This finding is also consistent with time-use studies reported in Juster and Stafford (1991). There were marked 
differences between Swedish and US men. US men worked more in the market, while Swedish men performed 
substantially more household work. In particular, Swedish men were the clear international leaders in home 
improvement time, averaging 4 hours per week, compared to 2.8 hours for US men and less than 1 hour for 
Japanese men. Total work time for Swedish and US men were virtually identical (57.9 vs. 57.8 hours). The 
amount of leisure time was approximately 3 hours longer per week in the US compared to Sweden for both men   20
arise through the rapid growth of an increasingly differentiated service sector. So why does 
not Sweden display a similar trend? A fundamental reason emanates from high rates of 
personal taxation. Personal taxes raise the full price of goods and services. For many goods 
(e.g., high-tech products like computers), a high price may cause the consumer to forego a 
purchase, or to buy a lower quality version of the good. This need not be the case with 
services – high labor taxes often induce the consumer to produce the service himself. This 
basic insight constitutes an important point of departure in recent work in the theory of 
optimal taxation. The theoretical results of Jacobsen et al. (2000) and Piggott and Whalley 
(2001) strongly suggest that the optimal tax structure involves a relatively low tax rate on 
those market-produced services that could alternatively be produced in the household sector.16 
High rates of taxation of labor tend to make it more profitable to shift a large share of the 
service production to the informal economy, in particular into the “do-it-yourself” sector. In 
the case where the cost of the service consists of labor cost only, one can show that it is 
profitable to produce the service in the market when (Pålsson 1997; Davis and Henrekson 
2005):  
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Let us call the right-hand side of this expression the tax factor.17 The expression describes a 
fundamental economic relation, which, given wage and productivity differentials, is a crucial 
determinant of the demarcation line between taxed and untaxed work. Low rates of taxation 
on labor require smaller wage differentials before tax and/or productivity differences in order 
to avoid that unpaid work crowds out professional work in cases where unpaid (or black 
market) work is feasible. 
 
The tax factor in Sweden is in the interval 2.7–4.1 (1997 tax code). In the US the tax factor is 
generally in the 1.4–1.9 interval. Comparisons between Sweden and the US (California) show 
that in order for a professional service producer to be competitive vis-à-vis unpaid household 
production, the professional must have a productivity edge of 170–310 percent in Sweden, 
                                                                                                                                                         
and women. Thus, “Swedish men, compared to US men, have less market work time, more home production 
time, and less leisure time“ (Juster and Stafford, 1991, p. 498). 
16 This result can apply even if these services are complementary to leisure.   21
whereas 40–90 per cent is sufficient in the US (in the case of equal market wage). 
Alternatively, in the case of equal productivity (e.g., child care) the hourly wage of the buyer 
must exceed that of the seller by a factor 2.7–4.1 in Sweden, whereas a factor 1.4–1.9 is 
sufficient in the US. 
 
As a result, the emergence of a large, efficient service sector competing successfully with 
unpaid work is less likely in a large welfare state than in countries with lower rates of labor 
taxation (and higher wage dispersion). As a corollary, an important arena for commercial 
exploitation and entrepreneurial business development becomes less accessible. Given that 
more than half of the total volume of work remains commercially unexploited in Sweden this 
is likely to be of great economic significance, particularly in the long run. When services are 
provided by professionals, incentives emerge to invest in new knowledge, to develop more 
effective tools, to develop superior contractual arrangements, to create more flexible 
organizational structures and so forth. Put simply, higher rates of personal taxation discourage 
the market provision of goods and services that substitute closely for home-produced services. 
As a consequence, higher rates of personal taxation reduce the scope for entrepreneurial 
expansion into new market activities that economize on time use or that supply close 
substitutes for home-produced services.  
 
 
5.5  Incentives for necessity entrepreneurship 
 
In the empirical literature on the determinants of the supply of entrepreneurship a distinction 
is often made between pull and push factors (Storey 1994). An individual can either be pulled 
into entrepreneurship in order to pursue a business opportunity (rather than having a regular 
job) or he/she can be pushed into it because there is no better choice for work or for making a 
living. Reynolds et al. (2001, 2005) explicitly distinguish between ”opportunity-based” and 
“necessity” entrepreneurship in their multi-country effort to measure the rate of 
entrepreneurial activity.18  
 
                                                                                                                                                         
17 The marginal tax rate includes the employee’s mandatory contributions to social security. 
18 Strictly speaking, necessity entrepreneurship is not consistent with the definition of entrepreneurship given in 
section 2. However, what was initially necessity entrepreneurship may in many cases at a later stage become 
opportunity-based entrepreneurship, when the entrepreneur discovers a growth opportunity in his/her business 
idea.   22
The effects of the welfare state discussed so far – taxation of entrepreneurial income and 
institutional impediments to commercial exploitation in large parts of the service sector – has 
primarily, at least implicitly, been concerned with the problem that a comprehensive welfare 
state curbs opportunities for entrepreneurs. But the welfare state also provides ample 
opportunities for receiving income from the public budget, either as a government employee 
or as a transfer recipient. Aggregate figures clearly show that these opportunities have 
increased sharply in Sweden during the postwar period. According to Table 4 there were more 
than 1.6 persons getting most of their income from the public budget for each person 
employed in the market sector in 2002. The corresponding figure in 1960 was 0.38.  
 
Table 4  Number of Tax-Financed and Market-Financed Individuals in Sweden 1960, 
  1990 and 2002 (millions) 
 
 1960 1990 2002 
1. Tax-financed individuals†  1,143 3,887 4,021 
2. Employed in market-sector‡  2,989 2,569 2,490 
Ratio (1/2)  0.38 1.51 1.63 
†The sum of public sector employees, old age pensioners, people on early retirement, paid sick leave, paid 
parental leave, refugee applicants and people receiving unemployment benefits or participating in labor market 
programs.  
‡Including the self-employed and those working in public utilities and government owned corporations but 
excluding those on paid sick leave and parental leave. 
Source: Lindbeck (1997) for 1960 and 1990, and authors’ own corresponding calculation for 2002.  
 
For the most part, the ambition of the welfare state to equalize outcomes is formally focused 
on individuals and households. However, there are enormous differences across regions in 
labor market opportunities, and as a result large interregional differences in employment 
levels may persist indefinitely, as large sums are transferred from high-employment to low- 
employment regions in the form of unemployment benefits, disability pensions, compensation 
through labor market programs and so forth. Table 5 reports the share of household income 
consisting of labor income paid by private employers in Swedish municipalities. This share 
varies from roughly 23 per cent up to two thirds. The country average is slightly below 50 per 
cent. Thus, these data clearly indicate that the push towards necessity entrepreneurship in low-
employment regions or in a region suffering from a negative shock is very weak.  
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The high tax on labor creates difficulties from another standpoint – a decent net wage 
presupposes high pre-tax earnings. This problem is particularly acute in Sweden, which places 
a heavy tax burden on the low-income earners. For someone who earns 75 per cent of the 
average wage of an industrial worker, 61 per cent of the total labor cost consists of taxes and 
mandatory social security contributions. This is the highest rate among industrialized 
countries (Norrman 1997).  
 
Table 5  Market Income as a Share of Total Household Income in Swedish Municipalities, 
1995 and 1998 (per cent). 
 
Top 5 municipalities  1995  1998  Bottom 5 municipalities  1995  1998 
Gnosjö 64.8  68.1  Pajala  22.8  23.5 
Håbo 61.1  63.9  Boden  24.7  25.4 
Täby 60.2  63.9  Haparanda  25.7  26.7 
Gislaved 60.1  62.8  Övertorneå  27.5  27.4 
Sollentuna 58.4  62.5  Sollefteå  29.3  29.3 
Country Average  45.7  48.9       
Note: Market income as a share of total income is defined as the share of total household income emanating from 
labor income paid by private employers. Income from capital is excluded. 
Source: SAF (2000). 
 
It seems reasonable to assume that there is a connection between the net wage the individual 
demands and the minimum income she is guaranteed by the social security system. The net 
wage demanded corresponds to a certain gross pre-tax wage, the reservation wage. The 
ingredients that determine the reservation wage are complex and dependent upon a number of 
circumstances. The social safety nets play an important role in the determination of the 
reservation wage. Ultimately an individual is entitled to social welfare, which guarantees the 
household a politically defined minimum standard of living.19 
 
Thus, the social safety nets provide a yardstick for measuring an appropriate reservation 
wage. Although other types of compensation, such as unemployment benefits for the 
uninsured and housing allowances, may provide less coverage, supplementary assistance can 
often be obtained up to the level guaranteed by the Social Security Act. A 1994 Swedish 
Government study (Ds 1994:81) demonstrated that a significant percentage of those who are 
active or potentially active in the work force, and who live in typical family constellations, 
                                                 
19  See Siebert (1997) for an interesting discussion of the interplay between the reservation wage and the social 
safety nets from a broader European perspective.   24
fell below this basic level. The study concluded that “jobs offering wages below or near what 
the ultimate social safety net provides are likely to disappear over the long run” (p. 201).  
 
The social safety nets affect what is considered a reasonable wage, the unions’ wage claims, 
and the kinds of businesses that entrepreneurs are willing to start. To the extent that social 
safety nets in welfare states push up reservation wages, they affect both types of 
entrepreneurship. They discourage necessity-based entrepreneurship by providing an 
alternative source of income at a reasonable level and they curb opportunity-based 
entrepreneurship by pushing up reservation wages so that many activities that are (initially) 
low-productivity activities are largely barred from entrepreneurial exploitation, since 
entrepreneurs have low incentives to start businesses that presuppose wages below the level 
guaranteed by the ultimate safety net. 
 
5.6 Miscellaneous  aspects 
 
In this subsection a few additional aspects that are likely to impede productive 
entrepreneurship are dealt with. Although important, they are deemed to be of lesser 
importance than the factors elaborated upon in subsections 5.1–5.5. 
 
(i)  Firms may be eligible for subsidies if they locate in low-income regions or if existing 
firms expand in those regions. A host of measures including both direct subsidies and tax 
breaks have been used to this effect. But as shown by Bergström (2000) it appears that in 
the long-run firms that have received support perform worse than other comparable firms. 
This kind of support increases the risk that entrepreneurial talent (a scarce resource) is 
attracted to inherently less productive activities (Murphy et al. 1991).20 
(ii) In order to equalize income across municipalities and regions a municipal tax-equalization 
scheme was introduced in 1966 and the redistributive stance of this scheme has been 
strengthened on several occasions, to the extent that there is virtually no correlation 
between local/regional government net tax receipts and per capita income in the 
municipality or county (Fölster 1998; Kommunförbundet, 2000). In fact, it is easy to point 
to cases where a boom in the local economy will worsen the financial situation of the 
municipality in question. This equalization of outcomes in yet another dimension has 
                                                 
20 Leonard and Audenrode (1993) find that transfers to ailing industries have negative growth effects.   25
made it at best economically indifferent for local government officials to promote 
entrepreneurial activity. 
(iii)The Swedish Employment Security Act (LAS) from 1974 gives employees extensive 
protection against unfair dismissal, and it is hence intended as an additional means to 
enhance economic security for individuals. The only legal grounds for dismissal are gross 
misconduct and redundancies. In the latter case, LAS stipulates a ”last in – first out 
principle”. Strict employment security provisions are likely to be more harmful for smaller 
and potentially fast-growing employers. For many firms – and in particular for firms with 
a good growth potential in terms of productivity and employment – there is a great need 
for flexibility both to increase the number of employees in response to rising demand and 
likewise to be able to rapidly contract when demand falls short of expectations. The road 
from small to large for a fast-growing firm is far from straight, since the activities of new 
firms in particular are subject to genuine uncertainty. If, under such circumstances, rules 
are imposed that reduce the firms’ leeway to rapid adjustment, one should expect both a 
lower willingness to expand in general and that fewer firms, despite a good product or a 
viable idea, grow from small to large in a short period of time.21 In addition, a strictly 
applied “last in – first out“ principle in case of redundancies implies that tenure at the 
present employer becomes relatively more important for labor security than individual 
skill and productivity. This fact increases the individual’s opportunity cost of changing 
employers or of leaving a secure salaried job to become an entrepreneur. 
 
 
5.7  The emerging picture of policy and its effects on entrepreneurial incentives  
 
In section 4 we sketched some broad predictions regarding policy in the Swedish welfare state 
with the starting point that an overriding theme has been the attempt to combine high taxation 
and ambitious welfare programs with favorable conditions for economic growth. We argued 
that the particular way of combining these has relied on preferential treatment of large 
established firms at the expense of individuals and smaller firms, and preferential treatment of 
physical capital intensive activities compared to human capital intensive ones. In this section 
we have looked at an array of different policies, which suggests an emerging picture in line 
with what was predicted in section 4. In the respective subsections we have shown that the tax 
system has in various ways favored established large firms over small new ones, institutional 
ownership over household ownership, as well as physical capital over human capital. The   26
emphasis on public provision in certain sectors has also hindered entrepreneurial efforts in 
these sectors. Overall the incentive structure has been one which both directs entrepreneurial 
activity and curtails its supply. We now turn to an examination of the outcomes of this 
particular incentive structure. 
 
6. Empirical  Evidence 
 
A first, although crude, measure consistent with the described weak incentives for 
entrepreneurship is the slow aggregate growth of the Swedish economy. Beginning in the mid 
1960s the rate of growth began to lag relative to the OECD average, and from 1965 until the 
mid 1990s, Swedish PPP-adjusted GDP per capita fell by close to 30 percentage points 
relative to the weighted average of the 23 richest OECD countries (Lindbeck 1997; 
Henrekson 2001). Although the relative decline has stopped, catching up in relative GDP per 
capita is only some 2 percentage points since the mid 1990s (OECD, National Accounts, 
February 2005).22 Aggregate private sector employment performance is also very weak. The 
entire growth in employment after 1950 until the early 2000s took place in the public sector, 
i.e. no new jobs net were created in the business sector during a fifty-year period despite 
population growth of more than 20 per cent and a rapid growth in female participation rates 
(Davidsson and Henrekson 2002). Hence, both the aggregate growth and private sector 
employment performance is consistent with what one would expect if incentives for 
entrepreneurship are important. 
 
In our context it is, however, more relevant to examine data that directly speak to the issue of 
the supply of entrepreneurship. Although one should not equate entrepreneurship to self-
employment, it is still worth noting that from the early 1970s until 1990, Sweden exhibited 
the lowest ratio of nonagricultural self-employment to civilian employment among all OECD 
countries (OECD Employment Outlook, July, 1992). The European Observatory for SMEs 
(1995) reports that Sweden had a lower self-employment rate in 1992 than any of the then 12 
member countries of the European Community (EC). The number of self-employed has also 
decreased in recent decades; comparing 2004 with 1980 and 1994, the number of self-
employed is down by 7 and 5 per cent, respectively (Statistics Sweden, 2005). 
 
                                                                                                                                                          
21 Davis and Henrekson (1997) discuss these issues more fully.  
22 Given that the real growth rate has been high compared to the EU and OECD averages since 1994 this may 
seem puzzling. However, in the same period Swedish terms-of-trade has declined rapidly.   27
In recent work Roine and Waldenström (2005) have studied top incomes in Sweden over the 
20
th Century. Of particular interest for the arguments here is the decomposition of income by 
source. As shown in Figure 1 the share of business income has gone down from close to 20 
per cent of an income earner in the top half of the distribution in 1945 to almost nothing in the 
year 1997. The pattern is virtually identical for the top decile as well as for the top percentile. 
This is in itself not proof that self-employment has gone down, and even less so that 
entrepreneurship has decreased over this period. It could be argued that particular tax laws 
make it profitable to choose different forms of compensation. What is undeniable however, is 
that this reflects either a decrease of the activity in itself or, at least, the fact that the tax 
system discourages earning business income to such an extent that it does not show up in the 
tax statistics (instead it shows up as wage or capital income). Either way it seems clear that 
policy over this period has discouraged the earning of business income. 
 
Figure 1  The share of total income (excluding capital gains) stemming from business 




Note: Total income is the sum of wage income, capital income and business income and the figure shows the 
share of total income which derives from business income for the upper half of the income distribution (P50–
P100), the top decile (P90–P100) and the top percentile (P99–P100) in the period 1945–1997. See Roine and 
Waldenström (2005) for series including capital gains and for more on the composition of income over time. 
Source: Roine and Waldenström (2005). 
 
More directly comparable estimates of the extent of entrepreneurial activity across countries 
can be derived from a major collaborative research effort, viz. the Global Entrepreneurship 
Monitor (GEM; see Reynolds et al. 2001, 2005). Its main goal is to arrive at internationally 
comparable estimates of the prevalence of “nascent entrepreneurs”, i.e. people who are in the 
process of starting a new business at a given point in time, or who have recently started a 
business that is still running. In Figure 2 the result of the GEM study for 2004 is displayed. It 
is clear that the level of nascent entrepreneurs is low in Sweden: roughly 3.7 per cent of the 
population is engaged in starting a business or running a business founded within the last 42 
months. This is the third lowest level among the 19 rich OECD countries participating in the 
GEM study in 2004. The expected pattern is also found for the prevalence of necessity-based 
entrepreneurial activity. The lowest activity in this category is experienced in the most 
extensive welfare states: Sweden, Denmark, Belgium, and the Netherlands. 
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Note: The level of total entrepreneurial activity (TEA) is defined as the percentage share of the population aged 
18–64 involved in either the start-up phase or managing a new business less than 42 months old. 
Source: Reynolds et al. (2005). 
 
 
There are also a number of indicators of a disproportionate importance of large firms in the 
Swedish economy. The European Observatory for SMEs (1995) reports that among 16 
European countries, Sweden showed the largest value for mean enterprise size in 1990. 
Average enterprise size was 13 employees in Sweden, more than twice the corresponding 
average value for the 16 countries. Jagrén (1993) found that relative to GDP, Sweden proved 
to have twice as many Fortune-500 firms as Japan and the UK, and four times as many as the 
US and Germany. Even compared to other countries dominated by large firms, such as 
Finland and South Korea, the number of large firms relative to GDP was substantially greater. 
Henrekson and Johansson (1999) document that Sweden had the greatest number of large 
industrial firms (500+ employees) per capita in Europe circa 1990. 
 
Hence, by the late 1980s there were no clear signs of a resurgence of entrepreneurship and 
small firms, a pattern that began to emerge almost two decades earlier in the US (Loveman 
and Sengenberger 1991). This picture is also consistent with studies where the growth of 
firms is examined. Birch and Medoff (1994) maintain that all new jobs net in the US are 
created in a fairly small number of rapidly growing firms (gazelles). Storey (1994, p. 113) 
reports that out of 100 small firms in the UK at a certain point in time, the four fastest-
growing firms will generate half of the total number of jobs created by these 100 firms. 
According to OECD (1998) there is now “general agreement” that the share of jobs created by 
small firms has increased since the early 1970s in most high-income countries. In contrast, 
little support for the gazelle hypothesis is found in Sweden (Davidsson et al. 1994, 1996). 
Instead they find that the contribution of small and medium-sized enterprises to net job 
creation is largely the result of many small startups. More specifically, Davidsson and 
Henrekson (2002) and Davidsson and Delmar (2003) study the employment contribution of 
the 10 per cent fastest-growing firms. Regardless of how they conduct the analysis (unit, period, 
type of growth) they are unable to find a small group of “elite” firms that collectively account for 
a substantial share of total job creation.   29
 
A final indication that the policy environment is unfavorable for entrepreneurial ventures is 
given by the experience of new technology-based firms. Sweden has the highest R&D 
expenditure both in total and in the university sector as a share of GDP in the OECD, and 
Sweden is second only to Israel in terms of publications of scientific and technical articles 
relative to the size of the economy (OECD 2001). Utterback and Reitberger (1982) made a 
comprehensive interview study of 60 firms, based on new technology, which had been 
founded between 1965 and 1974. The 60 firms constituted roughly half of the total population 
of such firms founded during that period. By 1980 the studied firms together contributed no 
more than roughly 0.5 per cent of total manufacturing employment. Rickne and Jacobsson 
(1996) update the Utterback and Reitberger study by following the 53 firms still fulfilling the 
original selection criteria through 1992. Of the 53 firms only nine had grown to have more 
than 200 employees in 1992. Taken jointly, the 53 firms employed no more than 3,400 
persons in Sweden in 1992.  
 
Table 6  The Distribution of the Stock of New Technology-Based Firms by Size in 
  1993 (all firms covered by the definition were founded in 1975–93). 
 
Size Number  of  firms 
in the category
Number of 




3–19 1,022 7,702 39.5 
20–49 196 5,886 30.2 
50–99 48 3,187 16.4 
100–199 15 2,009 10.3 
200– 3 704 3.6 
Total 1,284 19,488 100.0 
 
Source: Rickne and Jacobsson (1999). 
 
 
Rickne and Jacobsson (1999) study all new technology-based firms founded between 1975 
and 1993 (and still in existence in 1993) in Sweden. The main results from their study are 
summarized in Table 6. The employees of the new technology-based firms accounted for 2.2 
per cent of employment in the industries they belonged to (either manufacturing or 
manufacturing-related services). Thus, their share of total employment was very small and not 
a single one of the firms had more than 300 employees.  
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Given the overall picture conveyed by these studies, it is hardly surprising that not a single 
one of the 50 largest firms in Sweden in 2000 was founded after 1969 (Figure 3). This may be 
compared to the very different situation in the US in recent decades, where new and fast-
growing firms have generated not just most of the jobs but also the new industries (Audretsch 
and Thurik 2000).  
 









Are mature welfare states at a disadvantage when it comes to economic growth, 
innovativeness and employment creation? No doubt, high tax and benefit wedges have 
disincentive effects, but advocates can also point to likely advantageous effects. In the end, 
this is of course an empirical question, and it is not yet conclusively settled. In this paper we 
have systematically explored a number of aspects of one factor that has been largely 
overlooked in the discussion so far, namely, how a wide array of typical welfare state 
arrangements may influence the incentives for individuals to supply entrepreneurial effort, 
and, to a lesser extent, how this effort is distributed across productive and unproductive 
activities. We have also stressed how some of the ideas underlying the early Swedish welfare 
state are likely to have pushed incentives in favor of large, established firms and capital 
intensive production, at the expense of growth of new firms, especially in the service sectors. 
Such an incentive structure could in theory form the set of “appropriate institutions” for 
growth if large corporations are superior both in terms of productivity and innovation. 
However, if it turns out that entry, turnover and exit of firms as well as individual 
entrepreneurship is important, a set of policies which favor large incumbents is more 
problematic.  
 
In recent decades evidence suggesting that entrepreneurship is increasingly important for 
growth and employment creation has accumulated at a rapid rate. Leading scholars of the field 
speak of “the emergence of the entrepreneurial society” (Acs and Audretsch 2001). But the 
entrepreneur has been an alien figure in the welfare state. This is not so surprising given that   31
the main ideas underlying the (Scandinavian) welfare state model were largely developed 
during a period when it is was widely believed that the individual entrepreneur was waning in 
importance as a source of innovation, renewal, employment creation and growth.  
 
Our examination of how key welfare state arrangements in Sweden, allegedly the most mature 
of all welfare states, have structured payoffs suggests negative effects on the return to 
entrepreneurial behavior both in relative and absolute terms. A number of channels 
contributing to this effect have been examined: taxation of entrepreneurial income, muted 
savings incentives and savings encouraged to take forms that withdraw funds from 
entrepreneurial ventures, comprehensive government service provision and very high tax rates 
on labor that bar large parts of the economy from entrepreneurial exploitation. Furthermore,  
schemes for redistribution across individuals and regions and a high level of minimum 
standard of living guaranteed by the government renders necessity entrepreneurship 
unnecessary and strict labor security legislation discourages mobility of individuals across 
firms and industries. 
 
Performance measures for Sweden in recent decades do not contradict the hypothesis that 
favorable incentives for entrepreneurship are important for economic performance. In 
particular, the almost complete lack of new high-growth firms in Sweden is striking, despite 
recent record levels of R&D spending, and with an industry structure well-suited for taking 
advantage of the boom in the IT and biotech sectors in the 1990s (Elg 2005). As emphasized 
by Audretsch (2002) it is imperative that the really promising startups act in an environment 
where they can grow rapidly, because if scale economies are anything other than negligible, 
then the new firms have to grow in order to survive. Ultimately, they will have to attain the 
minimum efficient scale level of output, or they will go out of business. According to our 
analysis the government has a key role in creating an environment fostering the success and 
viability of firms, so that good ideas have a maximum chance to get translated into successful 
commercial ventures attaining their full potential.  
 
So is there scope for changing the incentive structure? In light of our analysis of the 
endogenous determination of policy some problems clearly stand out. The reliance on large 
incumbent firms and the public sector as the creators of employment opportunities and 
economic progress have made them seem indispensable. Their dominance has also turned 
these groups into powerful lobbyists for a continuation of traditional policies to foster future   32
growth. As pointed out by Lindbeck (e.g. 1995) it may be a difficult collective problem to 
unwind a welfare system in which most individuals have stakes. Similarly, it may be difficult 
to change industrial policy in a situation where many people have become dependent on the 
success of the incumbent large firms, and where vested interests have substantial political 
clout. 
 
Nevertheless, quite a few things can be done that cost fairly little and give strong incentives to 
individual entrepreneurs: 
(i)  Ownership taxation can be lowered considerably by removing double taxation and giving 
more room for closely held firms to pay dividends. Furthermore, capital gains taxation on 
long-term holdings of firms where the individual takes active part could be abolished 
(long-term capital gains taxation is in fact zero in the majority of the EU-15 countries). 
Such measures would send strong signals to existing and potential entrepreneurs, while 
costing very little in terms of taxes forgone. 
(ii) Savings can be “deinstitutionalized” so that large part of the pension wealth becomes 
available for equity investments in entrepreneurial firms. 
(iii)The public sector can implement a strategy for encouraging entrepreneurs to substitute for 
tax-financed public sector service production. A further step would be to allow service 
producers to offer additional services on top of what is granted through a tax-financed 
voucher system, while monitoring that tax-financed services are distributed 
solidaristically. 
(iv)  Retention rates can be marginally lowered across the board and qualification criteria can 
be made more stringent for transfer programs. This would not jeopardize the welfare state, 
but it would contribute to making entrepreneurship more attractive on the margin. 
(v) A more radical measure would be to announce that since the welfare state protects the 
individual through a number of cushions, the obligations for firms could be eased 
substantially: more liberal job security mandates, fewer demands on firms to take 
responsibility for sick leave, rehabilitation programs etc.23 
(vi)  Rights “earned” through tenure with the present employer could be made portable, for 
instance through a system of severance pay.24 After all, labor market inflexibility is an 
                                                 
23 In this respect Denmark differs greatly from Sweden. State provision of income security is at least as 
generous, while labor security legislation is among the least protective of insiders relative to outsiders in Europe. 
24 Severance pay is common in Italy, where large firms set aside a 13
th salary every year, which is paid out upon 
termination of the job, these arrangements are called TFR (trattamento di fine rapporto). The tax rate is only 10   33
element inherently inconsistent with the flexibility, nonhierarchical structures, networking 
and labor mobility across firms distinguishing an entrepreneurial business culture 
(Saxenian, 1996). 
Still, a mature welfare state will almost by definition have a high aggregate tax burden, and 
this necessarily implies high tax rates on labor and on locally produced services. As a result, it 
will be difficult to develop the household-related service sector as much as in low-tax 
countries. Likewise, individual savings incentives will be lower and reservation wages will be 
pushed up to higher levels by more generous social assistance schemes (relative to average 
income).  
 
Finally, a continued almost exclusive reliance on taxation for the financing of key services 
like education, health care, child care and care of the elderly can be expected to become 
increasingly problematic. These services are highly income-elastic, they suffer from Baumol’s 
Disease (Baumol 1993b), and technological breakthroughs are likely to increase the supply of 
services in the health sector in the future. As long as private purchasing power is not allowed 
into these sectors, they risk turning into a tax-financed “cost problem” rather than becoming 
potential growth industries attracting talented entrepreneurs. 
 
All in all, there seems to be some room for a mature welfare state to reform itself in ways that 
promote entrepreneurship, while the core of the welfare model remains intact. However, a 
vibrant entrepreneurial culture and the set of institutions that underpins such a culture seem 




                                                                                                                                                         
per cent, and allegedly this institution has made it possible for many redundant workers to start their own 
business.   34
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Figure 1  The share of total income (excluding capital gains) stemming from business 













Note: Total income is the sum of wage income, capital income and business income and the figure shows the 
share of total income which derives from business income for the upper half of the income distribution (P50–
P100), the top decile (P90–P100) and the top percentile (P99–P100) in the period 1945–1997. See Roine and 
Waldenström (2005) for series including capital gains and for more on the composition of income over time. 
Source: Roine and Waldenström (2005). 
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Note: The level of total entrepreneurial activity (TEA) is defined as the percentage share of the population aged 
18–64 involved in either the start-up phase or managing a new business less than 42 months old. 
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